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Fhe Court reviews for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the eyewitness

identification evidence is reliable. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is relevant to the disposition of this case:
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 16, 1999 defendant was charged aggravated burglary, robbery, unlawful
possession of burglary tools, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 20-22).
Following a three-day trial held January 19-21, 2000, a jury found defendant guilty of
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, but failed to reach a verdict on the three
remaining counts (R. 252:295-301). The trial judge declared a "hung jury" and scheduled
a new trial (R. 252:300-02).
On April 24,2000, after the initial trial, defendant filed a motion to exclude the
victim's, Ms. Gaffney's, eyewitness identification of defendant (R. 172-180). Following a
hearing, the trial court ruled that, based on Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the first trial, her
eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable and would be admissible at the impending
second trial (R. 253: 34-35).l In addition, the trial court denied the State's motion to exclude
the testimony of Dr. David Dodd, defendant's eyewitness identification expert (R. 253:22).

1

The trial judge and counsel agreed to forgo putting Ms. Gaffney on the stand at
the motion hearing and to rely instead on Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the first trial for
determining the reliability of her identification (R. 253:23-25).
2

At the second trial held May 17-18, 2000, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated
burglary and robbery and acquitted him of unlawful possession of burglary tools (R. 257: 5).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-to-life prison term on the aggravated
burglary conviction and to a one-to-fifteen-years term on the robbery conviction, the
commitments to be served concurrently (R. 230-31). Defendant timely appealed (R. 233).
The Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to this Court (R. 243-45).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On June 12, 1999, sixty-nine-year-old Joyce Gaffney was lying on her bed watching
television in her home located in the Glendale area of Salt Lake County (R. 251:111,113).
Because it had been a warm day, Ms. Gaffney had opened her kitchen and front room
windows and drawn back the curtains (R. 251:114, 117). At approximately 6:00 p.m., Ms.
Gaffney's house alarm went off (R. 251:113, 127). Ms. Gaffney looked away from the
television and saw a "streak go... from the kitchen into the front room" (R. 251:116). Ms.
Gaffney assumed that her granddaughter, notorious for accidentally setting off the alarm,
had once again tripped the alarm and entered the house (R. 251:116, 141).
Ms. Gaffney arose from the bed and walked towards the front of the house (R.
251:116). While still in the hallway, Ms. Gaffney saw defendant in the front room looking

2

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State
v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In accord with the parties'
agreement to have the trial court determine the reliability of the eyewitness identification
based on her testimony at the first trial, the facts are taken from that proceeding.
3

out the peep hole of the front door (R. 251:117, 119). She yelled, "[w]hat are you doing in
my house?" (R. 251:119). Defendant, who was "20 feet" from Ms. Gaffney, turned around
and looked at her (R. 251:119).
Once defendant turned around, Ms. Gaffney was able to "clearly" see defendant's
"facial features" and determine that he was a thin, African-American male, approximately
six feet tall (R. 251:17,136,172-73).3 Ms. Gaffney also noticed that defendant had a goatee,
was wearing "dark clothing" and a turned-around baseball cap, and that he had "mean eyes"
(R. 251:136-37). Ms. Gaffney's ability to see the defendant was enhanced by the natural day
light coming through the windows (R. 251:117). Upon seeing Ms. Gaffney, defendant
screamed, "Money, Bitch" and then "[m]ade a mad dash" towards her (R. 251:119-120).
Upon reaching Ms. Gaffhey, defendant began shoving her (R. 251:120-21).
Defendant repeatedly screamed at her, demanding money and calling her "[b]itch" (R.
251:120). Defendant shoved Ms. Gaffhey a total of "five or six times" (R. 251:120).
Defendant remained face to face and "in front o f Ms. Gaffney while shoving her (R.
251:122). Ms. Gaffhey responded by defensively pushing against the defendant and
screaming at him "I don't have any [money]" (R. 251:120-121). Even though Ms. Gaffney
never fell to the ground, she suffered leg and back problems as a result of defendant's assault
(R. 251:121).
Defendant eventually pushed Ms. Gaffney from one end to the other end of the

3

Ms. Gaffney is Caucasian (R. 255:132).
4

hallway (R. 251:122). Upon reaching the back of the hallway, defendant left iMs. Gaffney
and ran into her bedroom (R. 251:122). While defendant was in the bedroom grabbing Ms.
Gaffney's purse, Ms. Gaffney ran to the kitchen door (R. 251:122). Ms. Gaffney had the door
partially opened and was "three quarters of the way out" when defendant caught up with her
again (R. 251:123). Defendant pushed the door against Ms. Gaffney, trying to prevent her
from leaving the house (R. 251:123). Ms. Gaffney, however, successfully squeezed through
the door opening and ran outside (R. 251:123).
Once Ms. Gaffney was outside, defendant ran up behind her and shoved her against
the garage (R. 251:124). Defendant then ran past Ms. Gaffney, still holding her purse as
various items fell out as he fled (R. 251:124). After jumping the fence that surrounded Ms.
Gaffney's house, defendant dropped the purse and ran east, towards the railroad tracks and
Jordan River Park (R. 251:125-26).
After defendant left, Ms. Gaffney, frightened and upset, asked for help from a young
man who was walking with his child past her house (R. 251:127, 146). The man advised
Ms. Gaffney to call 911 (R. 251:146). In less than a minute after Ms. Gaffney called for
help, Officer Jason Knight of the Salt Lake City Police Department, who was on patrol one
block from Ms. Gaffney's home, arrived (R. 251:127, 152-53, 158-59). He inspected Ms.
Gaffney's house and the surrounding yard and noticed that defendant had entered the house
by placing a chair underneath the kitchen window and by cutting the screen to the kitchen
window (R. 251:160).

5

While Officer Knight inspected Ms. Gaffney's home, other Salt Lake City police
officers searched the surrounding area for someone matching defendant's description (R.
251:170). Officer Tracy Ita saw defendant exiting the Jordan River Park, located only a
couple blocks east of Ms. Gaffney's house (R. 251:172). Officer Ita stopped and questioned
defendant because he matched the description given by dispatch, "a male Black adult,
approximately six foot, thin build, wearing dark clothing and a black baseball cap, with a
goatee" (R. 251:172-74).
Upon stopping defendant, Officer Ita noticed that defendant's "face [was] literally
dripping with sweat" (R. 251:174, 178). Defendant was also carrying a blue duffle bag (R.
251:178). A search of the bag incident to defendant's arrest revealed numerous CD. 's, a pair
of knit gloves, a screw driver, and some drug paraphernalia (R. 251:178).4
After searching defendant, police called Ms. Gaffhey and informed her that they had
found a "possible suspect" (R. 251:134-135, 148). Within fifteen minutes of the offense,
Officer Knight drove Ms. Gaffhey a couple of blocks to where defendant was being detained
(R. 251:135, 163). Officer Knight did not discuss with Ms. Gaffney the identity of the
"possible suspect" being detained by the police (R. 251:163).
While remaining in the car, Ms. Gaffney was asked if she could identify the suspect
(R. 251:137). Defendant was handcuffed and standing with his back to Ms. Gaffhey (R.

4

The drug paraphernalia included a marijuana pipe, a crack pipe, a copper sponge,
and a spoon with burn marks (R. 251.181-82).
6

251:148). Ms. Gaffney asked that defendant be turned around Gaffney (R. 251:148). Upon
seeing defendant's face, Ms. Gaffney immediately identified him as being the man who had
entered her house (R. 251:137,148).
When Ms. Gaffney identified defendant, it was still light outside (R. 251.138). She
was approximately seven feet from the defendant (R. 251:138). Ms. Gaffney, who wears
bifocals for reading purposes, was not wearing her glasses at either the time of the incident
in her house, nor at the time she identified defendant (R. 251: 139-40; R. 255:133). Ms.
Gaffney had received a full night's sleep the night before the incident and was not on
medications, drugs, or alcohol during either the incident in her home or at the show-up (R.
251:133-34, 160).
Defendant was interviewed by Officer Martin Kaufman two days after the offense (R.
251:219). After receiving his Miranda rights, defendant denied any involvement in the
incident (R. 251:226-27). He also told Officer Kaufman that he had been in the park for an
hour or two and that he was sweating heavily when apprehended because he had just been
running (R. 251:219-21). Defendant also claimed that he was in the park with a male friend,
but that he would not divulge his friend's identity because he had a warrant out for his arrest
(R. 251: 220,227). At the second trial, a woman, Ms. Merri Ann June, testified that she was
the alibi referred to by defendant and that except for a ten minute interval, she was in Jordan

7

Park with defendant for approximately an hour prior to his arrest (R. 256:10-12).5 Ms. June
further testified that she and the defendant had not been running prior to his arrest, but had
been "sitting under a shade tree" (R. 256:17). Officer Ita testified that he did not see Ms.
June at Jordan Park when defendant was placed under arrest, and that the only people located
in the park at that time were a Native American male and a Native American female (R.
251:175; R. 256.30).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Based on factors adopted in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the
eyewitness identification was reliable. The victim, although admittedly scared after the
incident, had a good opportunity to view defendant's full face during the encounter in very
favorable conditions, her testimony remained consistent, and her identification was not the
product of suggestion. In fact, the circumstances of the identification were clearly superior
to those in Ramirez in every particular. Additionally, the trial court's findings were well
supported by the record.

5

Ms. June had attended the first trial, but did not come forward as an alibi witness
for defendant until the second trial (R. 256:25).
8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
RELIABLE
Defendant claims that the circumstances rendered the victim's

identification

unreliable under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. He further asserts that the trial
court's findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 12-22. The record belies
both assertions.
A. The Eye-witness Identification of Defendant was Constitutionally Reliable
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness
testimony is both potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986),
thereby requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to the
case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability," before admitting
such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 780 (Utah 1991). Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable," this Court listed the
following pertinent factors by which reliability must be determined:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood
9

that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area
includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of
the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor
was the same as the observer's.
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The burden is on the State to show that the
identification is reliable. Id. at 778.
Defendant argues that an application of the five Ramirez factors shows that Ms.
Gaffney's identification of him was constitutionally unreliable. Aplt. Br. at 12-15.
Specifically, defendant argues that Ms. Gaffney's identification should have been suppressed
because "[t]he eyewitness in this case viewed the assailant for a few seconds before being
attacked; the witness was distracted by a loud alarm; her fright, and concerns for her safety;
she was not wearing her glasses; she identified Appellant at a blatantly suggestive show-up;
and the assailant was a different race than the witness." Aplt. Br. at 1. To the contrary,
applying the Ramirez factors shows that Ms. Gaffney's testimony is constitutionally reliable.
Indeed, the identification in this case was made in far more favorable circumstances in every
particular than the identification in Ramirez, which was also found to be constitutionally
reliable. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-84.
I. The opportunity of Ms. Gaffney to view the defendant during the event
The first Ramirez factor to be considered in assessing an identification for reliability
is the witness's opportunity to view the defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. This includes
examining "the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance between the witness
and the actor; [and] whether the witness could view the actor's face." Id. The quality of
10

light and presence of distractions are also considered under the first factor. Id.
Ms. Gaffney had ample opportunity to view defendant. Ms. Gaffney first saw
defendant's face from twenty feet away when he turned to face her (R. 251:116, 119; R.
255:99, 101). At this moment, Ms. Gaffney was able to "see [defendant's] facial features
clearly" and determine that he was a thin African-American male who wore a goatee (R.
251:136; R. 255:102). Ms. Gaffney then continued to observe defendant, who was directly
in front of her, while he shoved her in the hallway (R. 251:122; R. 255:100, 105).6 Ms.
Gaffney again saw defendant when he forced the door on her to prevent her from leaving the
house (R. 251: 123). Lastly, Ms. Gaffney had the opportunity to view defendant as he ran
past her, jumped the fence, and fled away from her home (R. 251:124-26).
In each of the locations Ms. Gaffney viewed defendant, the lighting was good and
allowed her to clearly see defendant's face (R. 251:117,136). Although the alarm sounded
throughout the incident (R. 251:127), there is no evidence that Ms. Gaffney found it a visual
distraction, as defendant asserts. See Aplt. Br. at 15-16. In fact, she specifically paid
attention to defendant's face, which was unmasked (R. 251:136, 150). Thus, Ms. Gaffney

6

Defendant argues that at trial Ms. Gaffney admitted that while she was being
shoved in the hallway, she did not pay attention to her assailant. Aplt. Br. at 15. Ms.
Gaffney, however, clarified this statement, originally made at the preliminary hearing, at
the second trial (R. 249:20; 251:142; R. 255:123). At the second trial, Ms. Gaffney
simply stated that she wasn't able to "tell whether [defendant] was inebriated" when he
was shoving her (R. 249:20; 255:123). More importantly, Ms. Gaffney also stated at this
trial that she "did not have any difficulty seeing [defendant's] face" while the shoving
occurred (R. 255:102).
11

observed defendant in three locations within her home from various distances and angles.
While each of these observations was brief, in combination they allowed Ms. Gaffney a more
than adequate opportunity to view defendant.
2. Ms. Gaffney's degree of attention to defendant at the time of the event
The second reliability factor examines the witness' degree of attention to the
defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. This factor looks at whether the witness was "fully
aware [of] what was taking place" Id.
Ms. Gaffney was fully aware that defendant had broken into her home (R. 251:119).
From the moment she saw defendant, Ms. Gaffhey was undistractedly intent on observing
defendant and on escaping from him (R. 251:119-126, 136).
3. Ms. Gaffney's capacity to observe the event9
including her physical and mental acuity
The third reliability factor focuses on the physical and mental capacities of the
witness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. "Here the relevant circumstances include whether the
witness's capacity to observe was impaired." Id. Possible impairments are "stress or fright
. . . personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue,
injury, drugs, or alcohol. Id.
Ms. Gaffhey was not under the influence of drugs, medications, or alcohol when she
initially observed and later identified defendant (R. 251:133; R. 255:95). She testified that
the night before the incident she "had a full night's sleep" (R. 251:133-34). She also stated
that she did not feel "fatigued or stressed" before the incident (R. 251:134). There is also no
12

indication in the record that Ms. Gaffney's observation was impaired by personal
motivations, biases, or prejudices.
Defendant argues that Ms. Gaffney was "so frightened and upset that she lacked
presence of mind to call the police." Aplt. Br. at 16. However, that argument refers only to
Ms. Gaffney's state of mind after the encounter and fails to undermine her testimony that
during the encounter she could "clearly" see defendant's face (R. 251:136).
Defendant also argues that Ms. Gaffney's capacity to observe was further impaired
because she was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the incident. Thus, defendant
argues, "Ms. Gaffney only had a single brief glance of the assailant in the living room
outside the range of her visual defect." Aplt. Br. at 17.
Defendant, overstates the extent of Ms. Gaffney's visual problems. Ms. Gaffney
must wear eyeglasses in order to read small characters at very close range, such as letters in
a book or numbers on price tags at the grocery store (R. 251:117-18,140; R. 255:95-96). She
does not, however, need to wear eyeglasses for viewing larger objects, such as faces within
close range (R. 251:117-18,140; R. 255:118-20). At both the first and second trials, the
prosecutor tested Ms. Gaffney's eyesight at various distances (R. 251:118; R. 255:96-97).
Without the use of her glasses, Ms. Gaffney stated that she could "clearly" see the prosecutor
at distances beyond two or three feet and that even when viewing pictures, i.e., exhibits, she
"did not really need them" (R. 251:118; R. 255:96-97, 118-20). Thus, the fact that Ms.
Gaffney was not wearing her reading glasses during the incident did not interfere with her

13

ability to clearly discern defendant's features throughout his intrusion at her house and at the
show-up, where she saw him from approximately seven feet (R. 251:138).
4. Whether Ms. Gaffney Js identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent, or whether it was the product of suggestion
The fourth reliability factor assesses the genuineness of the identification. Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 783. The circumstances considered involve "the length of time that passed
between the witness's observations at the time of the event and the identification of
defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification;
the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from
other sources." Id. Other important circumstances include those "instances when the witness
or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant [and]
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification." Id.
This factor explores "whether the witness's identification was... the product of suggestion."
Id. at 784 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).
Ms. Gaffney identified defendant at the show-up only fifteen minutes after the
incident in her house, thus minimizing the memory-degrading effect of time (R. 251:135).
See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. Nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Gaffney's mental or
emotional state at the show-up identification was extraordinary for the circumstances or
interfered with her ability to make a reliable identification. Ms. Gaffney was also not
exposed to any other opinions or other sources of information concerning defendant which
would have altered the show-up identification.
14

Defendant argues that the show-up identification of the defendant was "a product of
suggestion." Aplt. Br. at 18. Salt Lake City police officers, however, were careful in the
procedures used for the show-up identification. Once defendant was placed in custody,
police officers called and informed Ms. Gaffney that they had a "possible suspect" (R.
251:148). Officer Kennedy expressly stated that he did not discuss law enforcement's
apprehension of a suspect while driving Ms. Gaffney to the showup (R. 251:163; R.
255:159). At the show-up, Ms. Gaffney remained in the car and was shown defendant who
was standing approximately seven feet away from her (R.251: 137,148-49; R. 255:130-31).
Defendant was handcuffed and standing with his back to Ms. Gaffney (R. 251 :137; R.
255:161). While there were a few policemen standing next to defendant, there were no lights
shining on defendant, as it was still light outside (R. 251:138; 255:159-60; R. 255:134).
When defendant was turned to face Ms. Gaffney, she immediately identified him as her
assailant (R. 251:137-38).
Ms. Gaffney's description of the incident, defendant's features, and the substance of
the verbal exchange between defendant and her remained consistent through three separate
hearings. Particularly, she described defendant as a tall African-American man who wore
facial hair, had "mean eyes," and who wore dark clothing and a turned-around baseball cap.
(R.249:8,25;251:136-37,144-45;R.255:106-07,127). The photograph taken of defendant
twenty minutes after the show-up identification shows that he matched Ms. Gaffney's
description (R. 251:164; State Exhibit 6).

15

The only point on which defendant challenges the consistency of Ms. Gaffney's
identification is the apparent discrepancy between her statement to the 911 operator that
defendant's shirt was "plaid," and her testimony at the second trial that the shirt was blue and
white. Aplt. Br. at 10 n.5, 18. This inconsistency is insignificant. First, the trial court's
ruling was necessarily made before the second trial, and thus this inconsistency cannot
reasonably detract from the court's ruling. Second, even assuming testimony from the
second trial is relevant, Ms. Gaffney emphasized that "[t]he only reason I [said plaid] is
because I could remember seeing the white and blue" (R.255:127). With respect to Ms.
Gaffhey's odd use of the word, "plaid," defendant fails to credit Ms. Gaffney's somewhat
idiosyncratic use of language. For example, Gaffney described defendant's facial hair as a
"mustache [which] went down and crossed [defendant's] chin" (R. 251:137; 255:107). Not
until the prosecutor used the word, "goatee" several times to express her description of
defendant's facial hair did Ms. Gaffney use that term (R. 255:107). The fact that the shirt
defendant was wearing when he was apprehended was "black" or "dark" (R. 251:172;
255:164-65), only minimally conflicts with her description of the shirt as "blue." In any
event, defendant concedes that Ms. Gaffney's identification "remained fairly consistent."
Aplt. Br. at 18. In fact, the consistency of Ms. Gaffney's descriptions of defendant at the
preliminary hearing and at the first trial was a relevant factor for the trial judge in deciding
toadmit her eyewitness identification at the second trial (R. 253:35).
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5. The nature of the event being observed by Ms. Gaffney and the
likelihood that she would perceive, remember and relate it correctly
The last reliability factor concerns the nature of the incident observed and the
likelihood of it being perceived and remembered correctly by the witness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 781. "This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the
mind of the observer during the time it was observed and whether the race of the actor was
the same as the observer's." Id.
Plainly, the entire incident was unique and memorable in Ms. Gaffney's experience.
Further, although Ms. Gaffney is Caucasian (R. 255:132), her cross-racial identification of
defendant may be quite sensitive. See Long, 721 P.2d 489 (recognizing that" identifications
tend to be more accurate where the person observing and the one being observed are of the
same race") (citations omitted). Ms. Gaffney testified that she had many African-American
friends, her "daughter was married to [an African-American male], and she has "two halfBlack grandchildren" (R.251:134, 146).
In sum, an application of the Ramirez factors shows that the trial court correctly
determined that, under the totality of circumstances, Ms. Gaffney's identification of
defendant was constitutionally reliable.
B. Ms. Gaffney's identification is superior to
the eyewitness identification in Ramirez.
While the foregoing, particularized application of the Ramirez factors demonstrates
the reliability of Ms. Gaffney's identification, that reliability is even more readily and simply
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proven by comparing this case with Ramirez itself
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court found reliable the identification of a gunman in
a nighttime robbery. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 884. The eyewitness, all the time under attack
from a pipe-wielding accomplice to the offense, identified the masked gunman (the
defendant) as he hid behind the corner of a building at a distance variously described as from
ten to thirty feet. Id. at 776, 782-84. The eyewitness viewed the defendant in time periods
variously described as from one second to a minute or longer in lighting variously described
as from "good" to "poor." Id. at 782-83. Prior to the showup, police officers told the
eyewitness that they had apprehended a suspect who matched the description given to them.
Id. at 784. At the showup conducted in the middle of the night, Ramirez had the headlights
from several police cars focused on him. Id. Notwithstanding that the case was "extremely
close," the Ramirez court held that "[considering the facts in the light most favorable to the
trial court's decision and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor
evidence, we cannot say that [the eyewitness's] testimony is legally insufficient when
considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability
and, therefore, admissibility." Id.
By contrast, the circumstances of Ms. Gaffney's identification were far more
favorable than those in Ramirez. Ms. Gaffney viewed her assailant from many different
angles and distances, in daylight, in her own apartment, and for a longer period of time than
did the eyewitness in Ramirez. During this time, Ms. Gaffney could "clearly" make out
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defendant's facial features (R.251:117, 136; R. 255:100, 105). Defendant was unmasked
(R.251:136). Ms. Gaffney was not given suggestive information by the police officers
concerning the description of the defendant, nor was defendant even spotlighted at the
showup, which occurred in daylight (R.251:138,163). Defendant admits that Ms. Gaffney's
identification remained "fairly consistent." Aplt. Br. at 18. In sum, even a cursory
comparison of the facts of this case with Ramirez compels the conclusion that Ms. Gaffney's
eyewitness identification was reliable and, therefore, admissible.
C. The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence.
Defendant argues that because the record fails to support the trial court's actual
findings, "they 'are against the clear weight of the evidence' and require reversal." Aplt. Br.
at 19 (quotting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782). Specifically, defendant argues for reversal
because the trial court (1) found that defendant "slowly" pushed his victim down the hallway,
(2) credited Ms. Gaffney's apparent confidence in her identification, (3) discounted the
discrepancy between Ms. Gaffney's description of her assailant's shirt and defendant's
clothes, and even speculated that defendant might have changed clothes in the park, (4) failed
to consider other compromising aspects of Ms. Gaffney's identification, and (5) abdicated
its gatekeeping function by granting defendant the benefit of an eyewitness identification
expert. Aplt's Br. at 19-21.
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Defendant's assertions may be treated in summary fashion.
1. Victim was "slowly"pushed
This argument focuses on a trivial deviation from the literal record. The State
acknowledges that the record does not state the rate at which defendant pushed Ms. Gaffney.
However, the trial court's reference is only part of the its overall assessment of the first
Ramirez factor, the eyewitness's opportunity to observe. Defendant fails to discuss the other
bases for the court's ruling on this factor, to wit: that "she was scared, but she was paying
attention to defendant's face;" "[s]he was looking at his face;" "they were face to face;" "[h]e
was saying words to her" (R. 253:35). These findings are well supported in the record (R.
251:17,136,172-73). Indeed, the court might reasonably have surmised, based on his view
of Ms. Gaffney as she testified, that a sixty-nine-year-old woman could only have been
"slowly" pushed if she did not fall.
2. Victim was "pretty positive" in her identification
The State acknowledges that to the extent the trial court may have identified Ms.
Gaffney's "'pretty positive'[] testimony of the identification of [defendant]," with her
"confidence," the trial court improperly imported a factor rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court in assessing eyewitness reliability. See State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, % 16, 413 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (rejecting "the 'level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining the constitutional reliability of an
identification") (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781). However, defendant singles out this one

20

irrelevant factor in the reliability assessment to the exclusion of other relevant observations
the trial court was legitimately entitled to make concerning Ms. Gaffney's demeanor on the
witness stand. The court also found her "credible," "convincing," "reliable," "quite calm,"
that her "mental acuity was excellent," and that "her testimony and her identification has
remained consistent throughout the course of. . . the trial" (R. 24, 35). In fact, while
Ramirez rejects the use of the eyewitness's level of certainty as a reliability factor, it
expressly bows to the trial court's privileged position to "appraise demeanor evidence."
Ramirez, &\7 ?2d at 1S4.
3. Discrepancy between victim 9s description of defendant's
shirt and defendant's clothes when he was apprehended
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court particularly noted that Ms. Gaffhey's
description of defendant's clothes was somewhat discrepant from those he was found in (R.
253:24,35). However, the court also noted that some of the clothes matched (R. 253:24,35).
The record fully supports this finding (R. 251:172-74). Considering this discrepancy, the
State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
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court stated: "As far as I am concerned, it is not enough to disqualify the showup or make
it inadmissible" (R. 253:35). In light of the discrepancy, the trial court mused about the
possibility of defendant's having changed his shirt in the park (R. 253:35). Plainly, the court
was merely speculating and not making a formal finding of fact.
4. Failure to consider other compromising factors in the victim Js identification
In Ramirez, the supreme court stated: "[T]his court upholds the trial court even if it
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failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the
court actually made such findings." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. In arguing that the
trial court failed to factor in various factors that apparently detract from the reliability of Ms.
Gaffney's identification, defendant has failed to acknowledge the foregoing directive in
Ramirez. Subpart B of this brief, supra, discusses at length the substantial record support
underlying the trial court's simple conclusion, that Ms. Gaffney had a good opportunity to
observe defendant, she was credible, her identification remained consistent, and,
notwithstanding some discrepancies in her observations from apparent fact, her identification
was reliable (R. 253:35-36).
5. Surrender of gatekeeping function by granting
defendant the benefit of an eyewitness identification expert
The record belies defendant's assertion that the trial court buoyed up its reliability
determination by allowing him to present an eyewitness identification expert.

After

acknowledging that defendant would be free to argue all the weaknesses of Ms. Gaffney's
identification through the expert's testimony and the cautionary instruction, the trial court
concluded by stating: "But I find everything to be reliable enough to allow the identification
to go ahead" (R. 253:36). Thus, the trial court expressly announced its belief that Ms.
Gaffney's identification was sufficiently reliable by itself, independent of whatever strength
defendant's case obtained by having the benefit of an eyewitness identification expert.
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In sum, the trial court's findings in support of its conclusion that the victim's
eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable are clearly supported by the weight of the
record evidence.7
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H

day of June, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

7

Defendant also argues that because only Ms. Gaffney's identification linked him
to the offense, the admission of her testimony, if erroneous, is not subject to harmless
error analysis. Aplt. Br. at 22-25. Fairly substantial circumstantial evidence linked
defendant to the offense. Specifically, Ms. Gaffney's description of defendant to the 911
operator closely matched defendant's description and the clothes he was wearing when
apprehended in the park (R. 251:172-74). Also, defendant was apprehended only a short
time after the offense, still sweating heavily (R. 251:219-21). Finally, his alibi was
evidently false, based on the substantial discrepancies between his statements when he
was apprehended and Officer Ita's observations and Ms. June's testimony (R. 251:175
220, 227; R. 256:10-12, 17, 30). However, the State acknowledges that this evidence is,
by itself, insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction.
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